Appendix 2


Karate Bob and Lubbers’ Muslim Bomb


The following article is taken from the Dutch internet site Kleintje Muurkrant: Its original title is “Lubbers en de Muzelmannenbom“, no author was mentioned. It appeared in 12 instalments from September 7 to October 18, 2005 and is printed here as a supplement to the above newspaper article and to appendices 8, 9 and 10 in Operation Twins I, in which Mitric asks Lubbers to finally live up to their contract, mentioned below. The name of the intermediary between Karate Bob and Lubbers, who was designated in Operation Twins I only by G. van H. and in the original Dutch internet version of this article by a certain X, is here, on the authority of Slobodan Mitric, revealed for the first time: it is Van Hulst, former head of the Dutch BVD (National Security Service), which in 2002 became the AIVD.


It caused but a wrinkle in the [Dutch] mainstream media: Lubbers pronouncement on august 9 of this year [2005] that the CIA was informed from the beginning of the activities of the Pakistani metallurgical engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb. And that the Agency preferred him to let him go his way. Supposedly, to be able map its network. Bullshit of course, but never mind. After a couple of members of the [Dutch Prime Minister] Balkenende gang declared the ex-premier more or less whoopee, and Lubbers himself did not come up with more details, the story disappeared into the archives. In spite of the fact that Ruud’s  story, to which Krista van Velzen from the [Dutch] Parliament  had already given a prelude, had a formidable impact.            We felt ourselves in fact nicely ´blubberd´ and not for the first time either.

We have, as it happens, already referred more often to another nuclear affair with which the womaniser from Kralingen [a suburb of Rotterdam] has had to do in his political career. In that context he got visit at home from two gentlemen on the evening of January 18, 1985. One of them he knew well. That was Jos Kieboom, his own consultant. He did not know the other one. It was a Rotterdammer, who was acting as an intermediary for the detained Slobodan Mitric, alias Karate Bob. The latter had in the various state institutions, where he was detained in the eighties, heard whispers in the grapevine concerning a secret nuclear deal between a business delegation from the Dutch industry and a mixed delegation from the Middle East plus in that context the theft of a sizable shipment of uranium.

            Mitric claimed to know where that uranium was and sought indirect contact with Prime Minister Lubbers. The latter regarded the matter obviously that serious that he took steps to have Kieboom arrange the afore-mentioned meeting with Mitric’s intermediary on January 18, 1985. Out of that meeting came the following list of demands made by Mitric as articulated by his intermediary on January 30:


“Following the delivery and affirmation of the sample, the detention of Mitric is to be suspended immediately. Mitric and persons to be appointed by him are then requested to negotiate at once to formulate their demands to Prime Minister Lubbers.

All demands made by me, Van Hulst, being:

            a residence permit for Mitric;

            protection for the informant involved;

            bail payment of the agreed amount

are to be met in advance.

With regard to the matter of the presence of representatives of foreign nations, this will be rejected.”


No trifle thus, but because the uranium sample was not delivered, the whole matter was eventually blown off. Which does not mean, however that the stolen uranium did not exist.

            It would be nice if Lubbers were to also go public concerning this affair. But then preferably from A to Z. Otherwise we continue to guess.



The intermediary, Van Hulst, between the then prime minister Lubbers and the detained Slobodan Mitric had not been chosen accidentally. Van Hulst had been, as it happens, from the beginning involved in the afore-mentioned secret negotiations between the delegation of Dutch businessmen and the motley crew from the Middle East concerning the nuclear deal. And – a happy detail – he had arrived on Augusts 4, 1984, because of a minor incident via a police cell in Maassluis, at the house of detention..

            After two days, he got a visit from an inspector, named “De Boer”, who invited him to work on a large forthcoming project. Now,Van Hulst sat there anyways, you can annoy yourself literally to death in jail, so why not? Within a couple days he got a new neighbour who had been transferred from Leeuwarden [in the Dutch province of Friesland] to Rotterdam. You can bet who that was, very well: Slobodan Mitric.

            In the months afterwards, “Bob” Mitric was to confide to his neighbour that he was busy closing a deal with the [Dutch central] Ministry of General Affairs. He wanted to get out of jail in exchange for disclosing the whereabouts of the stolen shipment of uranium. Would Van Hulst act as an intermediary when he got out again? Well, Van Hulst wouldn’t’t mind.

            Two days before the annual hustle and bustle concerning that stable in Bethlehem Van Hulst was freed. The first weeks he heard nothing. But before the first week of January 1985 was over, he got a phone call. If he would visit Bob a moment. Of course.

            According to the slightly agitated Mitric, the matter would come to a head and Van Hulst would be approached by a couple of chaps who would close the deal. And indeed, that same evening Van Hulst got a phone call. An unknown voice said:We are the people that Bob was talking about this afternoon. We want to talk with you for a while. If you walk now to the corner of the street, we will pick you up there. 

            The intermediary quickly put on his coat, ran to the corner of the street and stepped in a car filled with two men from [The Ministry of] General Affairs. After a short ride, the trio came to the parking lot of a restaurant where the boys from the Ministry explained what they wanted. If Van Hulst would cooperate in solving the matter, which Mitric had brought forward. Van Hulst hesitated, but the boys from the Ministry are known for their power of persuasion and Van Hulst finally came around. After he was brought back home, one of the men said

In two hours you will receive a telephone call.

            And he was right. About twelve o’clock the phone rang: With Kieboom. If you to go to Erasmus university tomorrow morning, you will  find me on the first floor at the Donner bookshop. There we can talk further.



Any doubts that Van Hulst, the intermediary of Slobodan Mitric, might have had about his appointment with Jos Kieboom were entirely eliminated the next morning. He found Lubbers’ consultant indeed on the agreed spot: the Donner bookshop on the first floor of Erasmus University. WhetherVan Hulst at that moment already knew what kind of function Kieboom held, remains a question.

After some obligatory preliminaries, the two gentlemen withdrew to a parlour. There Van Hulst unrolled the list of demands by Mitric that, in his view of the slow course the negotiations, had been modified repeatedly in the preceding period.

            Kieboom listened to Van Hulst and said patiently at the end of the conversation: Well, I know it now.  Wait a while longer. I will call you again and then I’ll take  you to someone.

            A few of days later, on Saturday  January 18, at the end of the afternoon, the intermediary got Kieboom on the line, who asked him if he could be at the Kralinger golf club at seven o'clock. There he would come by to pick up Van Hulst.

            Properly on time, the two men met each other again. This time at the parking lot of the golf club. Kieboom: Now I will bring you to someone with whom you can  definitively close the deal.

            They drove through the better part of Kralingen to a villa on the corner of Lambertweg and walked in the dark along the garden path to the front door, which opened almost immediately. Before he knew it, Van Hulst stood in the study on the first floor. Together with Kieboom. A moment later the occupant of the house made his appearance: Ruud Lubbers, the prime minister. And the conversation began.



The basic list of demands made by Slobodan Mitric was rather simple: official pardon after delivery of the sample of uranium, a residence permit, protection for the original informant and the deposit of three millions dollar in a Swiss bank with a down payment of 1 million. Furthermore, the intermediary requested Lubbers to find out if the British could possibly “take Mitric over” in matters of housing him and a job with some British secret service. If London agreed to this, Mitric would like to see that confirmed in an advertisement of [the biggest Dutch daily newspaper] “De Telegraph”.

            Lubbers did not find this a nice idea immediately. Also, the proposal to set Mitric free in exchange for information did not fall immediately into place. But after some insistence, he said with his eyes squeezed: Ah,  I don’t have to take care of that. But I know some people who are perhaps interested in his knowledge and they have enough power to secure his future.

            Eventually, Lubbers even agreed to place an ad in “De Telegraaf”, if the wishes of Mitric could be fulfilled. The text of it read:


“F. Giesberts must take the place of Martin. Sorry about half joker. This was fateful for him. The BIG INDUSTRIALIST wants to first read the book of 239 pages before it is definitively published. F. Giesberts has half the bait already. The vassal of the big industrialist has the other half. M.Amman and film star, as a matter of fact also a big madam, sit in the editorial commission. Don’t worry. You were and remain a loner. Your friend, Frank Waterfoort.”


Cryptic, but not unbreakable. M. Amman stood for the Israeli military intelligence service, the film star for president Reagan, the big madam for premier Thatcher and the big industrialist for Lubbers. The book of 239 pages was “The Dutch Mafia” that Mitric had conceived [should be “Operation Twins” according to Mitric, note by the translator] . But who was Martin, who according to the text apparently went around the corner [i.e. died] previously, because he possessed the half joker?

            Logically that could only be one: Martinus Fens, who was murdered on December 17, 1984. Alias “beautiful Tinus”, the uncrowned king of the underworld in The Hague and the protagonist in Mitric’ masterwork [The Dutch Mafia, not translated].





As mentioned in this series, Slobodan Mitric gathered his knowledge concerning the shipment of uranium, which floated around somewhere, as well as the nuclear deal between a delegation of Dutch businessmen and a mixed party from the Middle East, in his round of penitentiaries. But especially in Esserheem, where also Tinus Fens, the king of the underworld at that time in The Hague, was jailed for smuggling drugs.

            In the early spring of 1984, beautiful Tinus was released. Apparently everyone did not find that so amusing, because in May of that year he was shot in Café Petit Paris in The Hague by a couple of young hit-men.  Tinus was a tough guy. He survived the attack. But on December 17, the bell nevertheless tolled for him. A North-African shot him from nearby through the back of his head.

            According to newspapers from that time, the gunman had been engaged by two other toppers from the scene in The Hague: porno-king Henkie Bartels and gambling expert Henk Rijstenbil. During interrogation and the following  trial, both the gunman and Rijstenbil  denied all charges leveled at them. They both had nothing to do with the murder. Bartels sang like a canary. Consequence: Bartels and Rijstenbil went behind bars for a long time. The North-African was allowed to leave for lack of proof.

            A couple months after the sentence, Bartels was sent home because of his frail health. That appeared to be in Thailand where he spent five years before he departed to higher spheres.

            The question remains whether the death of Tinus Fens resulted indeed simply from a power struggle between him and the duo Bartels/Rijstenbil or whether the scenario was a lot more complicated. A scenario in which the nuclear question with which Mitric was playing joker also had a role. Perhaps something at this late date for Rijstenbil’s lawyer Gerard Spong.



In order to keep the pressure on, Mitric, after the visit by intermediary Giesberts on January 21  sent a letter to the house address of premier Lubbers with duplicates to the American, British, French and Israeli embassies. The contents read as follows:


“Your Excellency,

In the first place [I send you] my best wishes for the new year. By means of this letter, I want to turn to you with some questions. The contents of this matter could damage you if they are not true. For this reason, I have decided do let to this matter come directly to you. It is not in my interests to cause you harm in any way.

1. Have you ordered in December 1983 an investigation into the theft of uranium?

If yes:

a. Have you ordered the intelligence service of the Ministry of General Affairs to speak with me on your behalf in January 1984 concerning this matter?

b. Did the civil servant of the intelligence service of your ministry, Mr. Mansveld, have to negotiate with me on your behalf from January 1984 until July 20, 1984?

2. Did you order De Telegraaf to place the following small add on your behalf  on June 19, 1984?

Martin, your half joker is worth as much as my half joker. The big industrialist is very much interested in putting our jokers together. Greetings from Koos”.

If yes:

a. Did you know that by placing this ad, you agreed to my conditions?

The big industrialist is your code name, known at the Intelligence Service of General Affairs as well as by my informant in whose name I have done the complete transaction with you.

b. Conditions were:

1. That I would be granted the Dutch nationality.

2. That I would be paid 3 million US dollar,  1 million cash in advance to me (that I would be allowed to bring to Switzerland) and the rest by means of a written guarantee by a notary. Plus half a million guilders cash for the first kilo uranium.

3. From you the written guarantee that I would never be extradited to Yugoslavia against my will.

4. From you the written guarantee that I will never be prosecuted for this affair.

5. That all the debts that my informant owes in taxes are remitted (about 10 million guilders).

6. That the name of my informant will never be made public.

7. That my informant be given a complete new identity.

8. Permission for the import of goods, for this one time only, that are prohibited in The Netherlands. This is important, because these goods are used as payment by countries in the Middle East.

The detection of these goods serves as additional evidence.

As you know, by placing the above ad, you agreed to all the conditions.


3. Is it true that the following decision was made at an emergency meeting on July 20:

a. That you as Prime Minister (also minister of General Affairs) agreed to start the transaction with me?

b. That the minister of Foreign Affairs also agreed to my conditions?

c. That the minister of Justice did not agree?


Conclusion: That the whole affair was covered up as a result of the negative position of the minister of Justice as enacted by his advisors, among others the public prosecutor Mr. Van Os? The risk that this uranium will fall into enemy hands and be used against the state of Israel will then be entirely your responsibility. Not to forget the 10 barrels of radio-active waste that were stolen from Philips-Eindhoven and that are in danger of being sold to the IRA.


4. Do you know F. Giesberts?


5. Was F. Giesberts with you at the end of December 1984?

a. Did you permit police commissioner Blaauw to speak about the uranium issue with the Intelligence Services of General Affairs?

b. Did you grant him full powers to deal with me in future negotiations?

c. Did you receive from Mr. F. Giesberts the text of the ad that was to be placed in the section Small Ads of De Telegraaf?


“F. Giesberts must take the place of Martin. Sorry about half joker. This was fateful for him. The BIG INDUSTRIALIST wants to first read the book of 239 pages before it is definitively published. F. Giesberts has half the bait already. The vassal of the big industrialist has the other half. M.Amman and film star, as a matter of fact also a big madam, sit in the editorial commission. Don’t worry. You were and remain a loner. Your friend, Frank Waterfort.”


We know the identity of intermediary Giesberts as well as that of Mitric’s informant, but for the time being see no need to reveal their names.



If we can believe the data from the letter Slobodan Mitric wrote to prime minster Lubbers dated  January 21,1985 then the stolen uranium affair and –  be it to a lesser degree – the secret negotiations on Cyprus lasted more than a year. From December 1983 to in any case January 1985.

            Quite soon after his first edict to General Affairs (GA),  Mitric, according to the same data in the Schevening house of detention, was visited by an agent from IDB [Dutch CIA] operating under GA. It was Koos Mansveld, who introduced himself to Mitric as Mansfield.  During the next months agent Mansfield would visit his detained informant numerous times. First in Scheveningen and after March 27, 1984 in the cupola [jail] in Haarlem.

            Those visits must have given the Montenegrenian karate expert the impression that his information was taken seriously by the IDB. Question is whether the above sketch of events is a figment of the imagination of the caged ex-agent of Tito or the naked truth. The latter.

            This we can distil from a report of a staff member of the Haarlem detention center that he wrote at the end of July 1984, when Mitric was transferred to Leeuwarden. In that report, intended for his colleagues in the Frisian capital, he wrote, among other things, the following:


“During his stay here, the person concerned attracted the interest of the foreign intelligence  service, operating under the ministry of General Affairs. Mr. Mansfield, a member of this service [IDB], paid him numerous visits. This all happened in consultation with Mr. Van Hylkema and Mr. Van Os, Public prosecutor in The Hague.”


We asked the RVD [Public Relations Office of the Kingdom of The Netherlands] concerning this affair. The then head of this Office, also operating under GA, Hans van der Voet, admitted to our enormous surprise that a civil servant from GA had indeed visited Mitric. Further, he do not want go. Van der Voet: I can only say to you that it is true.



Not long after his detailed letter to Lubbers dated January 20, 1985 the sleuths called in by GA came to the conclusion that Mitric heard a nuclear bell ringing, but did not know exactly where the clapper was. That was sufficient to lower the storm flag and proceed to damage control. In other words, eliminating loose cannon Mitric. For example, during the appeal that the furious karate man had made in a law suit that three women had filed against him because of rape. Remarkable detail: one of the women was the former wife of Mitric’ informant in the uranium affair.

            The ex-agent of Tito vehemently denied the charges and claimed that it was a plot by the government in order to keep him behind bars and in this way to prevent him from bringing anything concerning the uranium affair into the open. For this reason, it was not astonishing that his lawyer at that time, Mr. H.C.W.F. Meijer in September of that year tried to place a number of persons on the witness list who were not directly involved with the [so-called] rape of the three ladies. They were successively:


“Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers, Lambertweg 4, Rotterdam.

He can explain that he in his function as minister-president in or around December 1983 ordered the Foreign Intelligence Service [IDB] operating under the ministry of General Affairs to contact S. Mitric, that he personally followed this contact, that he also ordered an investigation into the person of S. Mitric, that his ministry of General Affairs on the basis of the results of this research became convinced  that afore-mentioned S. Mitric did not commit these rapes and that he then in or around January 1985 through F. Giesberts got in touch again with S. Mitric;

Mansfield (initials unknown), at least a person who used this name as his own, c/o Executive Board Foreign Intelligence Service [IDB] Plein 20, The Hague.

He can explain that he was ordered by Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers, mentioned under a, to investigate the theft of a certain amount of plutonium, that he therefore approached S. Mitric and then established multiple contacts concerning this affair, that he came with S. Mitric to a sort of transaction, according to which S. Mitric was promised, among other things, money, acquisition of the Dutch nationality, at least a refugee passport, a guarantee against deportation from the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, protection of S. Mitric against possible reprisals and an investigation into the rape charges levelled against S. Mitric;


Dr. J.P. Kieboom, Zeekant 99f, The Hague.

He can explain that he in or around the months of November and December 1983 was approached on behalf of S. Mitric, that he then established contact with Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers, that the latter on the advice of Kieboom entered into proposals by Mitric and that an amount of 300,000,000 West-German marks was lent by the Dutch government to the Palestinian Hassan Sabaidi;


Mr. F.G.J. of Os, Barnsteenhorst 370, The Hague.

He can explain that and why he attempted in an unlawful manner to put pressure on S. Mitric’ lawyer at that time, Mr. L.D.H. Hammer, why he advised Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers to make no appointments with S. Mitric, that he said to be able prove that the statements by S. Mitric were at variance with the truth, that he ordered S. Mitric to be liquidated in the house of detention in Leeuwarden and that he called S. Mitric a rapist;


Mr. H.W. of Hylkema, Princess Margrietlaan 17, Voorburg.

He can explain that he advised Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers  to maintain no further contact with S. Mitric, that he knew that S. Mitric was a rapist - or, in case he did not know this, that and why he has nevertheless stated this - and that he ordered the liquidation of S. Mitric in the house of detention in Leeuwarden;


Mr. G.P.H. van Doeveren, Norgstraat 67, The Hague.

He can explain that he set the detained H. de Wolf in or around august 1983 free and why he did this, that he advised Dr. R.F.M. Lubbers to presuppose that S. Mitric was a liar, and that the amount of uranium and plutonium that Mitric was talking about was ‘worthless stuff’, that he called S. Mitric a rapist and that by all odds he incited women to level rape charges against S. Mitric.”

Although for Mitric, plutonium and uranium were apparently one and the same thing, there remains sufficient material to scratch yourself firmly behind the ears. Liquidation orders.  A mysterious loan to Hassan Sabaidi? What was that all about?

            Of course, you will hasten to say, the above-mentioned witnesses were not summoned. According to the presiding judge of the law court Wedeven and solicitor general Ficq, they had absolutely nothing to do with the rape case. In spite of the fact that the desired high profile witnesses stayed away, Mitric nevertheless tried during the court session to establish a link between the rape affair and the uranium matter. To no avail. He lost the case and remained behind bars. Which does not mean that the uranium matter was shelved and that it indeed concerned worthless stuff.



As has been said, the relation between Mitric and the Foreign Intelligence  Service [IDB] operating under Lubbers’ Ministry of General Affairs lasted more than one year. But how did that relation come about? That was through a letter, which the ex-agent of Tito sent to the turret [Prime Minister Lubbers’ parliamentary office in The Hague] and which contains the following moving strophes:

An international organisation which consists exclusively of Islamic, well-situated fanatics aims at all costs to construct a number of nuclear bombs and to have them explode on the territory of Israel. This organisation had nothing except money. Therefore it was forced to look for experts abroad. This way they came into contact with some Dutch and Belgian businessmen. Thus the plan construed by these fanatics slowly took shape. The organisation started by buying the raw materials necessary for the production of nuclear bombs.

They bought in the USA: 600 kilos of Uranium-235, in Switzerland five bars of Uranium-235 and in Belgium five bars of Uranium-235.

Furthermore they bought ten barrels of mass necessary for the creation of the nuclear link. Later it appeared that this mass was nothing else than radioactive waste, stolen from Philips-Eindhoven.


In June/July 1981, a meeting took place on the island of Cyprus between  the party giving the orders and the contractors. At that meeting were present:

            a member of the secret service of Syria

            a member of the secret service of Lybia

            a Jordan-Palestinian oil-sheik

            a civil servant of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (double agent Warschau Pact)

            a Dutch businessman (as of now code name Giesberts)

            a nuclear physicist/engineer of Italian origin

            a chemist/engineer or nuclear physicist from the Middle East


This meeting was strictly secret. The following was decided. Because all the material that the organisation had until then bought was not suited for making a nuclear bomb, an advance of 20 million dollar was paid to buy proper material. With that money, 60 kilos Uranium-238 (99.3 percent) were bought in Belgium. The leader of the group who provided this U-238 is an ex-minister of the Belgian government. The transaction between purchasers and salesmen was arbitrated by a civil servant from [the Ministry] of Foreign Affairs and Giesberts.

Interesting is that during the meeting on Cyprus the aim behind the purchase of uranium was discussed: making a couple of nuclear bombs and to let them explode in Israel and Great Britain. Giesberts became scared, but he could no longer go back. Giesberts sought contact with me and asked for advice in finding a way out. After I had given Giesberts the guarantee that I would never against his will say anything to third parties, he told me everything. We then agreed that I would negotiate on his behalf with the Dutch government.


F. Giesberts can provide:


            The complete identity of all persons involved

            60 kilos of U-238

            10 barrels of radioactive debris

            An illegal nuclear laboratory within the Benelux


According to F. Giesberts the organisation giving the orders has paid, after 20 million dollar in advance in 1982, another 100 million in the form of:

a. Money. Hidden in the diplomatic luggage of a very well-known Dutch lawyer and transported by the aforementioned civil servant of Foreign Affairs.

b. A number of transports of 10,000 kilos hash-hisch;

c. A number of transports of 15,000 kilos marihuana;

d. A number of transports of 50 kilos heroin;

Total wholesale trade value 100 million dollar.

Gold  valued at 250 million dollar. This has been not yet transferred to the salesmen (ex-minister Belgium). It is held in an African country.


Remarkable concoction, from which in any case it appears that the makers did not know too much concerning the enrichment procedure of uranium and the difference between U-238 and U-235. Moreover, it is clear that Mitric and the enigmatic Giesberts had known each other earlier than was suggested in part 2 of this series. But for the rest, there were nevertheless a couple of tasty balls in the soup. Lubbers thought that obviously too and sent agent Mansfield to the jug to see if Mitric had more enticing things to tell. And that he had.



Mitric told a lot about Fens, at that time king of the scene in The Hague. Part of it he had drawn from the tales of someone who maintained close contact with beautiful Tinus: Frans de Wit, alias Papa Blanca. A contractor who had also had some amorous affairs with Dame Justitia from which he did not escape completely intact. One of his customers was supposedly Hollandia Kloos. A company of the family Lubbers that was governed by Ruud and Rob. [1]

            That did not mean that Papa could not only live for a while on state costs, but that he had to cough up some ten million to pay premiums and tax money. Correct. De Wit was Mitric’ informant in the uranium issue. And not to forget in the background of the affair: the secret negotiations between a delegation of Dutch businessmen and the not so lively club from the Middle East. And what Mitric came know, Tinus Fens had already known for a long time. As already related in part 5 of this series, during the investigations of the IDB-agent Koos Mansveld and other sleuths, initiated by prime minister Lubbers, Fens was shot twice for his job. The last attack, on December 17, 1984, he did not survive (see part 5).

            Oddly enough earlier that year, on 28 Augusts, another intimate of Mitric who was aware of the two hazardous affairs, died suddenly. That was Kurt Görlitz, a prominent member of a secret organisation under the guidance of Hans Teengs Gerritsen, the bosom friend of prince Bernhard (see above all part VI of the “De schaduwkommando van de Prins” on, a series that was also to be found on the [now closed] website of Theo van Gogh “De gezonde roker”). That same week Mitric was transferred to Leeuwarden. In spite of his loud protests. Mitric was afraid that he would be assassinated there on orders of a couple of big shots at the Ministry of Justice (see part VIII of this series).

            To remain in the same sphere: on November 20, 1983 Cor Beets, owner of the largest Café for stolen goods in Amsterdam, De Metro, was murdered in his house above his business. Two Yugoslavians and an adventurous inhabitant from De Rijp, a rural village in North Holland, were apprehended. Although the murder weapon in the house of the Yugoslav in Purmerend was found,  the trio, because of lack of proof, were shortly thereafter able to sniff fresh air again. According to the moustached chaps from the Central Research Information Service (CRI) who were regularly tapping Cor’s telephone and his business connections, Beets was, together with Braspenninx (a living legend in the smuggler world of that time), busy with an “enormous deal”. This concerned a shipment of uranium that was stored in the port of Antwerp (see part 9 for Mitric’ references to the role played by a Belgian ex-minister and a party of businessmen in the uranium affair). A slightly bloody tale. Time for more cheerful news.



If there was one person exactly aware of the ins and outs of the nuclear affair in which Slobodan Mitric was to play a temporary role, then this must have been Giesberts. In the article “Steekspel rond een uranium-deal” (Duel Over an Uranium Deal) on the website “De morgenster”, it is described how the man, who in January 1985 placed the demands of the Montenegrenian karate master on the table in Lubbers’ home, got involved in this not so stringy affair. How through mega-conman Guido Haak in Lebanon he got to know the Palestinian businessman Hassan Zubaidi. And later also his partner Rifat Assad, the then head of the Syrian Secret Service and uncle of the current Syrian president. That was in Cyprus. Because both Zubaidi and Assad were from the beginning part of the   Middle-Eastern delegation at the successive secret discussions with the delegation of Dutch businessmen, who were mentioned by Mitric in his letters to Prime Minister Lubbers.

            We have never managed to find out exactly which Dutch companies (besides Ballast Nedam and Hollandia Kloos, which were mentioned by Giesberts) all wanted to lick the pot of the planned enrichment deal with Urenco in the form of compensation orders. But in our laborious dialogues in the course of years with the Dutch intermediairy, however, two names fell of chaps, who were heading the greedy Dutch club: Van Schaik and Lubbers.

            Concerning the question which Van Schaik it was, Giesberts was less explicit, but eventually it became clear that it must have been the engineer J.J. van Schaik, not an unknown at both Royal Shell and the Amsterdam engineering office Comprimo. Comprimo? Correct. The same company that in the same years played a secret role in the laying of the nuclear playing field of Dr. Qadeer Khan in Pakistan.

            Also concerning the question which Lubbers was on the field in Cyprus, Giesberts was little accommodating. We suggested Rob, but Giesberts named the name of Paul at a single occasion (see footnote ). Too bad, but because of Giesberts’ understandable reservation, we have not been able to really answer this question.

            Van Schaik and Lubbers were supported on Cyprus by a nice battery of experts. It was after all not peanuts. In this type of deals, it was not possible those years for Iran, for whom the enriched uranium was intended and which lay heavily under fire, to simply transfer the bread to The Netherlands and leave it at that.  A most charming scheme of compensation orders was thus concocted for a whole range of Dutch firms that would receive amounts much larger than normal. What would happen to the surplus amounts is easy to guess.

            That the phased negotiations did not run smoothly is an understatement. Giesberts:

It wasn’t easy. At a certain moment Van Schaik could stand it no longer. He yelled: ‘What am I supposed to do in heaven’s name?’ After internal consultation, he decided to let everything rebound. Panic naturally. The meeting was adjourned, but nevertheless continued after a while. After both sides had consulted the home front, it was possible to close a new deal. We had some very nerve-racking moments.


Do we have but one source for this charade on Cyprus? No, two. The other one will come next.



Truck driver Cor J. turned nothing down. This way he performed during his impressive career not only logistically high calibre feats for the Italian mafia, but just as cheerfully took to the road for Mossad or Dutch businesses. Just to name a few: In first half of the seventies, he worked for the freight carrier Frans Maas, nowadays listed on the [Dutch] stock exchange, but around 1976 he stepped over to the transport company Stoof in Breda. Not long afterwards the following transpired:

Cor: It must have been in 1977 when I drove parts of  a nuclear reactor to Portugal. With a double semi-trailer and two cranes.

KM: How did you know that they were parts of a nuclear reactor?

Cor: That was written in the  papers.

KM: Do you know what the destination was?

Cor: No, I don’t know. I had to pick up that cargo in the port of Rotterdam and transport it to an open area in the port of Lisbon. That transport was accompanied by a whole swarm of Dutchmen in inconspicuous cars. According to me, they were boys of the Royal Engineers, because they knew damn well what they were doing. It was, however, a long ride. With a double semi-trailer and such a heavy cargo you don’t get anywhere terribly fast. But those boys had permits for the complete route. Nowhere underway did we have any difficulties.

KM: Was it because of this haul that were approached later for that odd job on Cyprus?

Cor: I think so. They knew about it in any case. But I was not engaged immediately to go to Cyprus. That came later. First I attended a couple meetings in hotel Gascogne in Eindhoven and a hotel in Antwerp.

KM: Do you still know who were there?

Cor: I remember that there was a German captain of a coaster. But that’s all. I had stowed away my papers in my box, but they were been pinched. I remember that Mr. Diepenbroek of Trénité van Doorne was involved in this matter and a lawyer 's office from Rotterdam by the name of Sjollema. After that I was in Cyprus a couple of times.

KM: How many people were involved?

Cor: Always at least some thirty males. Arabs, Italians.

KM: You do you remember who was in control on the Dutch side? Van Schaik? Lubbers?

Cor: Van Schaik says nothing me, but there was a  Lubbers present.

KM: Which Lubbers? Rob? Paul?

Cor: No idea at all.

KM: Did you know that it concerned a nuclear matter?

Cor: Yes, naturally. It concerned the transport of a large cooling system.

KM: Did it go through?

Cor: That I don’t know, because I was caught in a smuggling job. And I got a visit from three gentlemen from Mossad.

KM: ?????

Cor: I was fishing  from  the Beemsterbrug [bridge in Purmerend, North Holland]. They said that I had to stop with that job, otherwise some  nasty things would happen.  I told  them then  that I had also done some things for Mossad and that they could confirm that  in Amsterdam, at  the consulate. But they  knew that. Therefore, it remained a warning. But I did get scared as hell.

Two witnesses thus  for the “ Cyprus project”  that  was handled in 1984/1985 by Slobodan Mitric and for Prime Minister Lubbers reason to send IDB agents in the field. Very likely in order to prevent further leaks. Stay tuned.


* * *


[1]  Ruud and Rob Lubbers took care of the daily chores of the firm, until Ruud became prime minister at the end of 1982. From that moment on Rob alone became the boss, but rumor has it that his brother Paul, who lived just across the Belgian border, also had his fingers in the pot..